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Illegal Stops and the Exclusionary 
Rule: The Consequences of Utah v. 
Strieff 
Emily J. Sack* 
In December, 2006, an anonymous caller left a message on a 
police drug tip line saying that there was “narcotics activity” at a 
particular house in South Salt Lake City.1  As a result of the tip, 
Officer Douglas Fackrell conducted “intermittent surveillance” of 
the home over the course of one week for a total of “approximately 
three hours.”2  In that period, the officer observed “short term 
traffic” at the home, with visitors arriving and leaving again 
within a couple of minutes.3  Though the traffic was not “terribly 
frequent,” Officer Fackrell believed that it was more than typical 
for a residence, and was “frequent enough that it raised [his] 
suspicion.”4 
Officer Fackrell observed Edward Strieff leave the house, 
though he had not seen Strieff’s arrival.5  The officer followed 
Strieff in an unmarked car, as Strieff walked down the street 
toward a convenience store.6  As he approached the store, Officer 
Fackrell ordered Strieff to stop in the parking lot.7  Strieff 
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
 1.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah 
v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 20, 2016). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  State v. Strieff, 286 P.3d 317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 2012), rev’d, 357 
P.3d 532 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 
13 (U.S. June 20, 2016).  
 7.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536 (Utah 2015), rev’d sub nom. Utah 
v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 20, 2016). 
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complied and Officer Fackrell identified himself as a police 
officer.8  He explained that he had been watching the house 
because he believed it was a source of drug activity, and then 
asked Strieff what he was doing there.9  Officer Fackrell also 
requested Strieff’s identification, which Strieff provided, and then 
relayed the information to police dispatch, asking them to check 
for outstanding warrants.10  When dispatch conveyed that Strieff 
had an outstanding “small traffic warrant,” the officer arrested 
Strieff on the warrant and searched him incident to arrest.11  The 
search uncovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia in Strieff’s pockets.12 
Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia; he moved to suppress 
the evidence, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal stop.13  The 
State conceded that Officer Fackrell had stopped Strieff without 
reasonable articulable suspicion because he did not see Strieff 
enter the house, did not know how long he had been there, and 
knew nothing of him other than that he left the house.14  
However, the State argued that the evidence should not be 
suppressed because the existence of the valid arrest warrant 
attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the 
discovery of the evidence.15  The trial court denied the motion to 
suppress, and Strieff conditionally pled guilty to reduced charges, 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of the 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  The record does not seem to indicate what, if anything, Strieff 
said in response.  At the oral argument, addressing this point with Strieff’s 
lawyer, Justice Alito noted, “Well, we really don’t know very much about 
exactly what happened here, which is unfortunate . . . .  [W]e don’t even know 
what your client said.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Utah v. Strieff, 
No. 14-1373, slip op. (U.S. 2016).  Strieff’s lawyer followed:  
[A] really important part of the officer’s testimony was that he didn’t 
remember what that answer was.  So if my client had said, I went in 
there because there’s someone who’s ill and I’ve been visiting for, you 
know, 20 minutes, or . . . this is where my friend lives; that’s why I 
was there, end of inquiry, and . . . the warrants check shouldn’t have 
been run.  A reasonably well-trained officer should know.   
Id. at 45. 
 10.  Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 536–37. 
 15.  Id. at 537. 
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motion.16  Utah’s intermediate court affirmed, but the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to “resolve disagreement about how the attenuation 
doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the 
discovery of a valid arrest warrant.”17  In a 5–3 opinion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the attenuation exception 
to the exclusionary rule applied to the case, and that the evidence 
here should not be suppressed because the discovery of a valid 
arrest warrant broke the causal chain between the illegal stop and 
the discovery of the drug evidence on Strieff.18 
Strieff stands at the crossroads of two highly controversial 
criminal procedure issues—the scope of the exclusionary rule and 
the legitimacy of police stop-and-frisk protocols—and it is likely to 
have a significant impact in both areas.  The Court took a further 
step in its continuing limitation of the exclusionary rule through a 
broad interpretation of its attenuation exception.19  Further, by 
holding that evidence obtained through an illegal stop will be 
admissible when the suspect has an outstanding arrest warrant, 
the Court granted the police broad discretion to stop first, and 
develop a legitimate basis for an arrest and search later.20  The 
Court refused to acknowledge the major consequences of this 
decision for police-citizen relations—particularly in poor and 
minority areas—provoking an angry dissent by Justice Sotomayor, 
who explicitly linked the exclusionary rule doctrine and the 
 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Strieff, slip op. at 6.  
 18.  Id. at 13.  Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. Id. at 3.  Justice 
Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined in part.  
Id.  Justice Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg also 
joined.  Id. Utah v. Strieff was argued just nine days after the death of Justice 
Scalia, on the first day of oral arguments since his death. See Andrea 
Garland, Utah at the United States Supreme Court Without Scalia, 29 UTAH 
B.J. (2d ser.)10, 10 (May–June 2016).  As it turned out, Justice Scalia’s vote 
would not have changed the outcome in the case.  However, given his opinion 
in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), see infra text accompanying 
notes 43–49, we can speculate that his presence may have moved the Court 
even further in limiting the exclusionary rule. See Orin Kerr, Opinion 
Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-
analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/. 
 19.  See Strieff, slip. op. at 10. 
 20.  See id. at 9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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impact of police misconduct on the street for our citizens.21 
I. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, ATTENUATION DOCTRINE AND THE 
RULE’S PURPOSE 
To understand the developments in Strieff, it first is 
important to explore briefly the trajectory of the exclusionary rule 
since its recognition by the Court early in the twentieth century.  
In Weeks v. United States, in discussing the use of evidence 
obtained illegally by the police, the Supreme Court said: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and 
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an 
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and 
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed 
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the 
Constitution.  The efforts of the courts and their officials 
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they 
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great 
principles established by years of endeavor and suffering 
which have resulted in their embodiment in the 
fundamental law of the land.22 
The Court thus held that evidence obtained from an 
unconstitutional search or seizure in a federal case must be 
excluded from use in a criminal trial.23  It extended the 
exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, holding that: 
[I]n extending the substantive protections of due process 
to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or 
federal—it was logically and constitutionally necessary 
that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of the right 
to privacy—be also insisted upon as an essential 
ingredient of the right . . . .  To hold otherwise is to grant 
the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and 
enjoyment.24 
 
 21.  See id. at 12. 
 22.  232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).  
 23.  Id. at 398.  
 24.  367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961).  In Wolf v. Colorado, the Court held 
that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the Due Process 
Clause, but declined to find that the exclusionary rule must also be applied to 
state prosecutions. 338 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1949).  The Mapp Court overruled 
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The Court subsequently held that the scope of the 
exclusionary rule extended not only to evidence obtained as a 
direct result of a Fourth Amendment violation, but also evidence 
that is derived from its illegality, the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”25 
The Mapp Court repeatedly referenced the Constitution as 
the basis for the exclusionary rule, indicating that it considered 
this remedy to be constitutionally required.26  For example, in 
discussing Weeks, the Court in Mapp referred to the exclusionary 
rule as a “clear, specific, and constitutionally required—even if 
judicially implied—deterrent safeguard without insistence upon 
which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to ‘a form 
of words.’”27  The Court referred to its “holding that the 
exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,”28 and discussed the “constitutional 
exclusionary doctrine.”29 
However, in the years after Mapp, the Court began to disavow 
the constitutional basis for the rule, instead referring to it as a 
“judicially created remedy.”30  Though the Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
Constitution “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of 
evidence obtained in violation of its commands.”31  If suppression 
is just a “judicially created rule,”32 rather than a constitutional 
requirement, then the courts have greater discretion to limit its 
application.  This change in characterization was part of the 
process by which the Court limited the scope of the rule, and 
began to recognize several exceptions to its application.  Three of 
these exceptions concern the causal relationship between the 
constitutional violation and the evidence obtained—the 
 
that portion of Wolf to hold that the states must adhere to the exclusionary 
rule to suppress illegally obtained evidence.  367 U.S. at 654–55.  
 25.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963); see also 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (quoting Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).  
 26.  367 U.S. at 648. 
 27.  Id. (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
392 (1920)). 
 28.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.  
 29.  Id. at 659. 
 30.  See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
 31.  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995).  
 32.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139−40 (2009). 
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independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
and the attenuation doctrine.33  Under the independent source 
doctrine, evidence obtained in an unlawful search may be 
admitted if it also was acquired lawfully from a separate, 
independent source.34  The inevitable discovery doctrine permits 
admission of illegally obtained evidence if it inevitably would have 
been discovered lawfully.35  Under the attenuation doctrine, 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted when the connection 
between the constitutional violation and the evidence is broken by 
an intervening circumstance, thus ‘“dissipat[ing] the taint.’”36  
Though the evidence may not have been discovered but for illegal 
police conduct, the question for attenuation is whether the 
evidence “‘has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint.’”37 
Just as the Court’s characterization of the source of the rule 
changed over time, it also began to narrow the identified purposes 
for the rule.  Like the change in source, this narrowing of purpose 
also had the effect of limiting the rule’s scope and application.  In 
Mapp, the Court made clear that there were multiple purposes for 
the exclusionary rule.  The Court identified deterrence of police 
misconduct as one important reason.38  If the evidence obtained 
from an illegal search or seizure were not admissible, this would 
jeopardize convictions; therefore, wanting to avoid this outcome, 
police would refrain from illegal conduct.39  However, the Court 
also noted that the exclusionary rule was required because of “the 
 
 33.  Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 20, 2016) 
(citations omitted). 
 34.  Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)); see Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796, 805 (1984) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 392 (1920)); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963). 
 35.  Nix, 467 U.S. at 432, 443−44 (emphasis added). 
 36.  Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 
U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).  
 37.   Id. at 487−88 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).  
Though not discussed in the Court’s opinion in Utah v. Strieff, in prior 
opinions the Court has repeatedly stated that the prosecution has the burden 
of proving the admissibility of the evidence.  Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
604 (1975); see Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003). 
 38.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 39.  Id. at 648 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392). 
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imperative of judicial integrity.”40  As the Court put it in Wong 
Sun v. United States, suppression of illegally obtained evidence 
protected Fourth Amendment rights both by deterring lawless 
conduct by officers, and by “closing the doors of the . . . courts to 
any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.”41  Reliance upon 
such illegally obtained evidence would taint the judicial process, 
by condoning the exploitation of constitutional violations. 
However, in later cases, the Court began to drop the judicial 
integrity rationale, concentrating solely on the deterrence 
explanation for the exclusionary rule.42  In Hudson v. Michigan, 
writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained the dependency 
of the exclusionary rule on deterrence.43  Because the exclusionary 
rule has “substantial social costs,” it is applicable only where the 
benefits of deterrence outweigh these costs.44  As the Court put it 
in Davis v. United States, “[t]he rule’s sole purpose, we have 
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment 
violations.”45  As commentators have noted, this sole focus on 
deterrence has made it possible to limit the application of the 
exclusionary rule.46  If exclusion is not likely to deter an officer’s 
behavior, under this theory there is no other plausible purpose for 
excluding the evidence involved.  Hudson, the 2006 decision 
written by Justice Scalia, may indicate most clearly the use of the 
deterrence rationale to limit the application of the exclusionary 
rule, which he said “has always been our last resort, not our first 
 
 40.  Id. at 659.  
 41.  Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 599 (“These 
considerations of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become 
rather commonplace in the Court’s cases.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S 338, 357 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that judges should 
“avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness.”).  
 42.  Donald A. Dripps, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment Forty 
Years Later: Toward the Realization of an Inclusive Regulatory Model, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1885, 1899 (2016); Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A 
Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1555, 1574–75, 1606 (2015); George C. Thomas III, Mapp v. Ohio: Doomed 
from the Beginning?, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 294–97 (2014) (citing 
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347). 
 43.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 594−97 (2006).  
 44.  Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)). 
 45.  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (citations 
omitted).  
 46.   See Ristroph, supra note 42, at 1606–07; Thomas, supra note 42, at 
291.  
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impulse.”47  Justice Scalia argued that though deterrence is 
necessary for exclusion, it is not sufficient, since “the value of 
deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit 
the forbidden act.”48  He said that we should not assume that 
exclusion in one context is “necessary deterrence simply because 
we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts 
and long ago.”49 
Though the Strieff Court did not completely abandon the 
exclusionary rule, it did continue to undermine it; though it 
claimed to be applying existing attenuation doctrine, its reasoning 
significantly broadened the exception. 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ATTENUATION EXCEPTION 
A threshold question for the Court was whether the 
attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule was even the 
appropriate doctrine to consider in this case.  The trial court and 
Utah Court of Appeals had both upheld the admission of the 
evidence based on their interpretation of the attenuation 
exception to the exclusionary rule.50  However, in reversing the 
lower courts, the Utah Supreme Court first held that the 
attenuation doctrine did not apply to this case, reasoning that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had applied the doctrine only where there 
were intervening circumstances “involving a defendant’s 
independent acts of free will.”51  Such independent acts would 
include a defendant’s voluntary confession or consent to a 
search.52  Unlike such acts, the discovery of an outstanding 
warrant is neither initiated by the defendant, nor an independent 
act.  In addition, it is an entirely foreseeable event arising out of 
the stop or arrest, so it cannot be viewed as “sufficiently removed 
from the primary illegality.”53  The Utah Supreme Court found 
that the inevitable discovery exception did apply to these facts, 
 
 47.  Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.  
 48.  Id. at 596.  
 49.  Id. at 597. Justice Scalia went on to explain the changed 
circumstances since Mapp which made the exclusionary rule less necessary, 
which included increased deterrence that comes from the development of civil 
remedies for citizens claiming violations by the police, as well as the 
increased professionalism of police forces.  Id. at 597−99. 
 50.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536, 537 (Utah 2015). 
 51.  Id. at 544−45.  
 52.  Id. at 544. 
 53.  Id. at 545. 
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but held that here the exception was not satisfied.54  The Utah 
court said that the doctrine was implicated in the case, because it 
involved two parallel acts of police work—the stop which was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and the execution of the 
outstanding warrant, which was lawful.55  However, the doctrine 
requires that “the fruits of the lawful investigation would 
inevitably have come about regardless of the unlawful search and 
seizure.”56  Though the arrest and search incident to arrest here 
were lawful, they were the result of the unlawful stop, and it 
would be “difficult at best”  to show such inevitability because “we 
cannot know whether Strieff might ultimately have had this 
contraband in his possession on any future date on which he may 
have been arrested on the outstanding warrant.”57 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Utah 
Court in quick order.58  Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas 
rejected the view that the logic of prior Supreme Court cases 
relating to attenuation was limited to independent acts by the 
defendant.59  Finding that the attenuation doctrine was the 
appropriate framework to consider whether the evidence should 
be excluded in this case, the Court applied three factors first 
identified in the attenuation case of Brown v. Illinois.60  To 
consider whether or not the attenuation exception was satisfied, 
the Court looked to the “‘temporal proximity’” between the 
unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence; ‘“the 
presence of intervening circumstances;’” and ‘“the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct.’”61 
III. THE BROWN ATTENUATION ANALYSIS 
A. Warrants and the Meaning of Intervening Circumstances 
The Court conceded that the first factor, temporal proximity 
between the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence, 
 
 54.  Id. at 544, 545. 
 55.  Id. at 545. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 546. 
 58.  Apparently the defendant also had not pressed this argument at the 
U.S. Supreme Court. See Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 5 (U.S. June 
20, 2016). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 5−6 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975)).   
 61.  Id. at 5−6. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603−04). 
272 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:263 
argued in favor of suppression, since the officer discovered the 
drugs just minutes after the illegal stop of the defendant.62 
The Court also did not spend much time on the second and 
more controversial factor, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, finding that it “strongly favors the State.”63  Here, 
the warrant was valid; moreover, it predated the officer’s 
investigation and was entirely unrelated to the stop.64  Once he 
knew of the warrant, the officer had an obligation to make the 
arrest; this was “independently compelled” by the pre-existing 
warrant, and after a lawful arrest, it clearly was lawful to perform 
a search incident to arrest.65 
However, both Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor 
explained in their dissents why this was not an appropriate 
application of the intervening circumstances factor in attenuation 
analysis; both argued that the warrant was not an independent 
intervening factor that dissipated the taint of the illegal stop. 
Justice Sotomayor distinguished the circumstances in Strieff 
from the classic attenuation case of Wong Sun v. United States.66  
In Wong Sun, an individual, who days earlier had been illegally 
arrested, voluntarily returned to the police station to confess to a 
crime.67  Though the illegal arrest was a “but for” cause of the 
confession, the police did not exploit the illegal action to obtain the 
confession, and the Court held that the confession could be 
admitted into evidence.68  Referring to the Court’s opinion in 
Wong Sun, Justice Sotomayor stated, “[w]e reasoned that a Fourth 
Amendment violation may not color every investigation that 
follows but it certainly stains the actions of officers who exploit 
the infraction.”69  The Brown factors distinguish evidence 
obtained through innocent means from that obtained by exploiting 
misconduct.  Here, she argued, there was no intervening innocent 
conduct.70  The officer stopped Strieff illegally and immediately 
 
 62.  Id. at 6. 
 63.  Id. at 6−7. 
 64.  Id. at 7. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 3−4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963)). 
 67.  Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Strieff, slip op. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 70.  Id. at 5. 
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checked for a warrant.71  Justice Sotomayor noted that the 
“discovery of [the] warrant was not some intervening surprise that 
[the officer] could not have anticipated;”72 she pointed out that 
Utah had over 180,000 misdemeanor warrants in its database and 
the county involved had a large backlog of outstanding 
warrants.73  The officer’s, 
sole reason for stopping Strieff, [the officer] 
acknowledged, was investigative—he wanted to discover 
whether drug activity was going on in the house . . . . The 
warrant check . . . was not an “intervening circumstance” 
separating the stop from the search for drugs.  It was part 
and parcel of the officer’s illegal “expedition for evidence 
in the hope that something might turn up.”74 
Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority’s view that a 
warrant would “clean up whatever illegal conduct uncovered it” 
was a “remarkable proposition.”75 
Justice Kagan agreed with this view of intervening 
circumstances.  She asserted that checking for warrants during 
stops was a routine procedure in Salt Lake City, and that the 
standard stop procedures were “partly designed to find 
outstanding warrants;”76 “[a]nd find them they will, given the 
staggering number of such warrants on the books.”77  As Justice 
Kagan noted, the attenuation doctrine embodies the concept of 
proximate cause.  The question is whether there is an intervening 
circumstance that breaks the causal chain between the illegality 
and the evidence.78  She explained that in proximate cause 
analysis, “a circumstance is intervening only when it is 
unforeseeable.”79  Given the numbers of outstanding warrants and 
the routine procedure of the police to conduct checks when 
stopping individuals, the officer’s discovery of the warrant here 
 
 71.  Id. at 4. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 5 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606 (1975). 
 75.  Id. at 5−6. 
 76.  Id. at 5 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Id. Justice Kagan also cites examples from other jurisdictions with 
large numbers of outstanding warrants. Id.  
 78.  Id. at 4. 
 79.  Id. 
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was “eminently foreseeable.”80  She elaborated: 
So outstanding warrants do not appear as bolts from the 
blue. They are the run-of-the-mill results of police stops—
what officers look for when they run a routine check of a 
person’s identification and what they know will turn up 
with fair regularity.  In short, they are nothing like what 
intervening circumstances are supposed to be.81 
Though both dissenting opinions appeared to agree with the 
majority that the attenuation doctrine was applicable to the facts 
of this case, they interpreted the “intervening circumstance” far 
differently from the Court.  While they did not go as far as the 
Utah Supreme Court in finding  that this circumstance had to be 
an act of the defendant’s free will,82 they did agree that the 
evidence must be obtained in a way that was not exploitive of the 
illegality that preceded it.83  This view is consistent with the 
Court’s prior understanding of the three related exclusionary rule 
exceptions: the independent source doctrine allows evidence to be 
admitted because the police did not exploit the initial illegality but 
obtained it from a lawful, independent source; the inevitable 
discovery doctrine allows evidence to be admitted because the 
police did not exploit the initial illegality but inevitably would 
have obtained it from a lawful independent source; and the 
attenuation doctrine allows evidence to be admitted because the 
police did not exploit the initial illegality but derived the evidence 
through an independent intervening circumstance that therefore 
dissipated the taint of the illegal conduct.  This makes sense when 
one considers that the Court has focused on deterrence as the sole 
rationale for the exclusionary rule.  If the police are not exploiting 
the illegal conduct to obtain evidence, there is no deterrence 
purpose for excluding this evidence.  To put it conversely, the 
exclusion of evidence will deter the police from committing illegal 
acts, if they are exploiting this illegality to obtain the evidence. 
The Strieff Court, consistent with earlier cases, made clear 
that deterrence of police misconduct was the sole purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.  As the Court stated, “[t]he exclusionary rule 
 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 5. 
 82.  Id. at 3. 
 83.  Id. at 1. 
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exists to deter police misconduct.”84  Therefore, even under the 
Court’s rationale for the exclusionary rule, the admissibility of the 
evidence in this case does not fit into the attenuation exception 
and does not make sense.  By grouping this kind of intervening 
circumstance into the attenuation exception, the Court has 
measurably expanded the doctrine. Further, it has become 
unhinged from the rationale that supported it. 
B. Purpose, Flagrancy, and Good Faith 
Justice Thomas spent the most time on the third factor in the 
Brown analysis: whether the officer’s conduct was purposeful and 
flagrant.85  This is critical to the majority because without such 
behavior, there is no possible deterrence of police misconduct to be 
achieved by exclusion of the evidence, and therefore no purpose for 
doing so.86 
The Court found that Officer Fackrell’s conduct in this case 
was not purposeful and flagrant.87  Justice Thomas stated that 
the officer was “at most negligent” and made two “good-faith 
mistakes” in stopping the defendant.88  First, he did not know how 
long Strieff had been at the house, and so he did not have a 
sufficient reason to conclude that Strieff was a short-term visitor 
who may have been involved in a drug deal.  Second, because he 
did not have that reason, he “should have asked Strieff whether 
he would speak with him, instead of demanding that Strieff do 
so.”89  Further, the “mistaken” stop was followed by lawful 
conduct—the arrest based on the warrant and the search incident 
to arrest.90 
Justice Thomas’ use of the phrase good faith is noteworthy; in 
the context of the exclusionary rule, these words connote the “good 
 
 84.  Id. at 8. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. (“The third factor of the attenuation doctrine reflects that 
[deterrence] rationale by favoring exclusion only when the police misconduct 
is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.”); see 
also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the 
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
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faith exception” developed in United States v. Leon.91  There, the 
officers had relied on a warrant issued by a magistrate, which was 
later determined to be invalid.92  The Court ruled that because the 
officers had reasonably relied in good faith on this warrant, the 
evidence that the warrant-based search had uncovered should not 
be excluded.93  Since the officers did not and reasonably could not 
have known that the warrant would turn out to be invalid, their 
behavior was “in good faith.”94  But here, Justice Thomas equated 
a negligent mistake with good faith.  The point of Leon was that 
the police themselves did not engage in any unreasonable 
behavior; under the Court’s reasoning in that case, there would 
therefore be nothing to deter.95  But such is not the case here; by 
definition, the concededly illegal stop was unreasonable and 
Officer Fackrell’s failure to recognize that was not a “good faith 
exception” as used in exclusionary rule doctrine. 
Further, Justice Sotomayor took issue with the majority’s 
characterization of the officer’s illegal conduct as simply negligent, 
and in good faith in a more general meaning of the term.  She 
argued instead that his unlawful conduct was deliberate and 
purposeful because his “sole purpose was to fish for evidence.”96  
In her dissent, Justice Kagan also pointed out that “far from a 
Barney Fife-type mishap, Fackrell’s seizure of Strieff was a 
calculated decision, taken with so little justification that the State 
 
 91.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 922 (1984). 
 92.  Id. at 903.  
 93.  Id. at 922. 
 94.  Id. at 919–21 (“[W]here the officer’s conduct is objectively 
reasonable, ‘excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . 
the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar 
circumstances’. . . . This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer 
acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge 
or magistrate and acted within its scope.  In most such cases, there is no 
police illegality and thus nothing to deter.”) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 539–40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 95.  See id.  
 96.  Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 7 (U.S. June 20, 2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor also argued that even 
assuming this conduct could be considered negligent, negligence can be 
deterred by the exclusionary rule, and in fact may be “most in need of the 
education” gained through exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Id.  
Therefore, counter to the Court’s argument, there is real deterrence to be 
gained by excluding the evidence in these circumstances even if we accepted 
the Justice Thomas’ characterization of the officer’s behavior. 
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has never tried to defend its legality.”97  Officer Fackrell’s own 
testimony at the suppression hearing made clear that the stop had 
an investigatory purpose; he said it was to find out what was 
going on in the house and what Strieff was doing there, and he 
admitted that he had no basis for the stop other than the fact that 
Strieff was exiting the house in question.98 
Justice Thomas countered that the officer was actually 
stopping Strieff to find out what was happening inside a house 
where he legitimately suspected drug activity, and so this was not 
a “suspicionless fishing expedition.”99  Justice Thomas seemed to 
assume therefore that the illegal conduct did not meet the 
purposeful and flagrant standard. 
There are several problems with this assumption.  First, 
Justice Thomas conflated the suspicion the officers may have had 
about the home with that necessary to detain Strieff.  A stop 
requires individualized reasonable suspicion that the person 
detained is committing a crime.100  Even assuming that the officer 
did have reasonable suspicion that drug activity was transpiring 
in the home, he still required separate reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Strieff was involved in that activity.  The officer could 
have tried to ask Strieff to provide information consensually as he 
apparently did upon his initial contact. However, he could not 
detain him under the Fourth Amendment, as all concede he did 
when he immediately asked for and retained Strieff’s 
identification in order to conduct the warrant check, unless he had 
the required reasonable suspicion about Strieff himself.  This the 
officer clearly did not have.  As the State conceded, the officer did 
not know how long Strieff had been in the home, did not know who 
he was, and Strieff had done nothing suspicious upon exiting the 
home and walking toward a nearby convenience store.101  As 
Justice Sotomayor put it, “[t]he officer did not suspect that Strieff 
had done anything wrong.  Strieff just happened to be the first 
person to leave a house that the officer thought might contain 
 
 97.  Id. at 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 98.  Id. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (finding the illegal 
arrest at issue purposeful because it was “investigatory”). As Brown stated, 
“[t]he detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that 
something might turn up.”).  Id. 
 99.  Strieff, slip op. at 9. 
 100.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 101.  State v. Strieff, 357 P.3d 532, 536–37 (Utah 2015).  
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‘drug activity.’”102  Even assuming the officer was looking only for 
information about the home, because the officer had no knowledge 
of the length or reason for Strieff’s visit and he obviously lacked 
the necessary suspicion, the detention was in fact a “suspicionless 
fishing expedition.” 
 Second, it seems highly implausible that the police officer 
only wanted information about the home and did not view Strieff 
himself as a potential suspect.  The two beliefs are connected; 
clearly he thought Strieff might have information about drug 
activity because he thought that Strieff may have been a short-
stay visitor who was a drug purchaser.  Most important, the 
immediate warrant check belies Justice Thomas’s assumption that 
the officer was interested only in obtaining information from 
Strieff about the home.  Clearly the warrant check would enable 
the officer to investigate Strieff as a suspect himself and 
determine whether he had a basis to detain or arrest him.  Though 
Justice Thomas characterized this check as a “negligibly 
burdensome” safety precaution,103 there is no basis for this belief, 
either factually or legally.  There was no reason for the officer to 
fear for his safety.104  Strieff merely had walked from the house to 
the convenience store, and he readily complied when the officer 
ordered him to stop.105  Further, it is hornbook law that an officer 
cannot justify a further Fourth Amendment intrusion based on his 
fear of the defendant, when he had no basis to approach the 
defendant in the first place.106  In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor 
commented that, “[s]urely we would not allow officers to warrant-
 
 102.  Strieff, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 103.  Id. at 8 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 
(2015)). 
 104.  In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the officer, by his 
own account, did not fear Strieff. Strieff, slip op. at. 6 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 105.  See Strieff, 357 P.3d at 536–37. 
 106.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., 2 CRIM. PROC. § 3.8(e) (4th ed. 2015) 
(“In determining the lawfulness of a frisk, two matters are to be considered: 
(i) whether the officer was rightly in the presence of the party frisked so as to 
be endangered if that person was armed; and (ii) whether the officer had a 
sufficient degree of suspicion that the party frisked was armed and 
dangerous.  As to the first, Justice Harlan helpfully commented in his 
separate Terry opinion that if ‘a policeman has a right . . . to disarm a person 
for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in 
his presence.’  Thus a mere bulge in a pedestrian’s pocket, insufficient to 
justify a stopping for investigation, would not be a basis for a frisk by a 
passing officer.”). 
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check random joggers, dog walkers, and lemonade vendors just to 
ensure they pose no threat to anyone else.”107  This was a 
purposeful investigative detention blatantly without any 
reasonable suspicion.108 
Nevertheless, according to the Court, the conduct of the officer 
also was not purposeful or flagrant because it did not indicate 
“any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”109  This echoes 
language in Herring v. United States, where the Court held the 
exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence obtained in an illegal 
arrest which was due to an error in a police database, since it was 
“the result of isolated negligence,” rather than a systemic 
problem.110 
Justice Sotomayor took particular issue with the majority’s 
view that the illegal conduct in this case was only an isolated 
occurrence; “[r]espectfully, nothing about this case is isolated.”111  
She pointed out that there are over 7.8 million outstanding 
warrants in this country, mostly for minor offenses such as failure 
to pay a traffic fine, a missed court appearance, or curfew or 
alcohol violations for probationers.112  Justice Sotomayor provided 
the example of Ferguson, Missouri, where 16,000 people out of a 
total population of 21,000 had outstanding warrants against 
 
 107.  Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 20, 2016) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 108.  See id., at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that an officer 
violates the Fourth Amendment when he detains an individual to check his 
license without any evidence that the person is engaged in crime, and 
“deepens the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for 
evidence of wrongdoing”). 
 109.  Strieff, slip op. at 8. 
 110.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).  In another 
context, Justice Kennedy had pointed out the importance of systemic 
violations to the application of the exclusionary rule.  In Hudson v. Michigan, 
he concurred in the decision not to suppress evidence obtained after a 
violation of the constitutional knock and announce rule. 547 U.S. 586, 602-04 
(Kennedy J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Today’s 
decision does not address any demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce 
violations.  If a widespread pattern of violations were shown, and particularly 
if those violations were committed against persons who lacked the means or 
the voice to mount an effective protest, there would be reason for grave 
concern.”).  Apparently, in this case, Justice Kennedy, who joined the 
majority opinion, agreed that there was no systemic violation, despite the 
concerns raised by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor in their dissents. See supra 
notes 77-81 and infra notes 111-19, and accompanying text. 
 111.  Strieff, slip op. at 7 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
 112.  Id. 
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them.113  She pointed out that police can and do stop people 
without cause by using these outstanding warrants.114  Citing 
U.S. Justice Department investigations, she noted that in the St. 
Louis metropolitan area, officers routinely stop people for no 
reason other than an officer’s desire to check for pending 
warrants.115  In Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,335 
pedestrians within a four-year period, and ran warrant checks on 
39,308 of them.116  The Justice Department analysis of the stops 
where warrant checks were performed found that approximately 
93% of them “‘would have been considered unsupported by 
articulated reasonable suspicion.’”117  And, though most officers 
may not set out to violate the law, “this does not mean that these 
stops are ‘isolated instance[s] of negligence.’”118  Justice 
Sotomayor contended that many of these illegal stops are actually 
the result of institutionalized training procedures, which teach 
police to ‘“stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion 
later.’”119 
Justice Thomas ultimately had to concede that the stop was a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but he argued that this did 
not mean it rose to the level of being flagrant; “[f]or the violation 
to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the 
mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.”120  While that 
statement is accurate, it doesn’t answer the arguments made by 
the dissenting justices that the stop that occurred here involved 
more than the “mere absence of proper cause.”121  The majority 
opinion never takes on the real implications of the type of 
unconstitutional stop at issue here; it was a purposeful 
investigatory detention without any legal basis, and part of a 
pattern of police misconduct—i.e., a flagrant violation.  Justice 
 
 113.  Id. at 8. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 8-9 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., 
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, 8, 19, n. 7 (2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findin
gs_7-22-14.pdf.). 
 118.  Id. at 9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 8). 
 119.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ligon v. New York, 925 F. 
Supp. 2d 478, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y.)) stay granted on other grounds, 736 F.3d 118 
(2d Cir. 2013)) (discussing New York City Police Department training).   
 120.  Id. at 8. 
 121.  Id.   
2017] ILLEGAL STOPS & THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 281 
Thomas simply found that “[n]either the officer’s purpose nor the 
flagrancy of the violation rise to a level of misconduct to warrant 
suppression.”122 
Weighing all the factors, the Court held that the evidence was 
admissible because its discovery was sufficiently attenuated from 
the illegal stop by the arrest warrant.123  Although the temporal 
proximity factor was in favor of the defendant, it was outweighed 
by the other two factors.  The arrest warrant was an intervening 
circumstance that was “wholly independent” from the illegal stop, 
“compelling” Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff.124  And, the Court 
found it “especially significant” that the officer’s misconduct did 
not “reflect flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”125 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE 
In her strenuous dissent, Justice Sotomayor immediately 
made clear the substantial implications of the Court’s decision.  
Addressing the audience directly, she began her dissent: 
The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for 
an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s 
violation of your Fourth Amendment rights.  Do not be 
soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case 
allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your 
identification, and check it for outstanding traffic 
warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.  If the 
officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, 
courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into 
evidence anything he happens to find by searching you 
after arresting you on the warrant.126 
The Court gave only minimal consideration to Justice 
Sotomayor’s concerns.  In a paragraph near the end of his opinion, 
Justice Thomas stated that it is “unlikely” that police will engage 
in dragnet searches if the exclusionary rule is not applied in the 
situation raised by this case.127  Such conduct would expose the 
police to civil lawsuits, and further, the “purpose and flagrancy” 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 1. 
 127.  Strieff, slip op. at 10. 
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prong of attenuation doctrine would act as a limitation; “[w]ere 
evidence of a dragnet search presented here, the application of the 
Brown factors could be different.”128 
But as Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent, the 
majority’s opinion created what she termed “unfortunate 
incentives” for the police, and “practically invites them to do what 
Fackrell did here.”129  Though her tone differed from that of 
Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan agreed that the Court has not 
considered the implications of its ruling, which are counter to the 
precise goal of the exclusionary rule it espouses.  Justice Kagan 
appeared to agree with the majority that deterrence is the purpose 
of the rule.130 Noting that a rule excluding the evidence obtained 
in circumstances like this would achieve exactly this result, she 
pointed out that the majority’s decision will have the opposite 
result.  As long as the detained individual is one of the many 
millions of people with an outstanding arrest warrant, any 
evidence uncovered in an illegal stop is now “fair game for use in a 
criminal prosecution.”131  Therefore, the officer’s incentive to 
violate the Fourth Amendment increases, since there is now a 
potential advantage to stopping without reasonable suspicion—
“exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule is supposed to 
remove.”132 
But Justice Sotomayor went further.  In a part of her dissent 
not joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor made a direct 
and explicit link between illegal stops, the failure to exclude 
evidence obtained from them, and relations between the police 
and the community. 
In a comprehensive critique, Justice Sotomayor first provided 
a litany of all the lawful powers that “this Court has given 
officers . . . to probe and examine” people.133  An officer can stop 
an individual “for whatever reason he wants—so long as he can 
point to a pretextual justification after the fact.”134  That 
justification may factor in your ethnicity,135 where you live,136 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 6 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Id. at 1 (“The exclusionary rule serves a crucial function—to deter 
unconstitutional police conduct.”). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 6. 
 133.  Id. at 10 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 134.  Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). 
 135.  Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 
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what you were wearing,137 and how you behaved.138  The officer 
does not even have to know what law you may have violated, if he 
later can justify the stop based on “any possible infraction—even 
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.”139 Further, the 
officer may ask you for your “consent” to search without telling 
you that you have a right to refuse.140  If he thinks you might be 
dangerous, he can frisk you,141 and if you have violated even a 
minor crime such as driving without your seatbelt, he can 
handcuff you and take you to jail.142  At the jail, the officer can 
fingerprint you, swab DNA, and make you shower with a 
delousing agent. 143  Your arrest record will provide you with the 
“civil death” of discrimination by employers and landlords.144 
After this powerful rendition of the consequences of a lawful 
stop, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that this case involved a 
“suspicionless stop, one in which the officer initiated this chain of 
events without justification.”145  And, Justice Sotomayor noted, it 
is people of color that are disproportionately impacted by these 
types of illegal stops.146 
 
(1975)). 
 136.  Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)). 
 137.  Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1989)). 
 138.  Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)). 
 139.  Id. (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154–55 (2004); Heien 
v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)). 
 140.  Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)). The 
quotations around consent are Justice Sotomayor’s. 
 141.  Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 17 (1968)).  
 142.  Id. at 11 (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323–24 (2001)). 
 143.  Id. (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of 
Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012)); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 
1980 (2013)). 
 144.  Id. (citing Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking 
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1805 
(2012)). 
 145.  Id. (emphasis in original).  Though her focus in this dissent is on 
illegal police conduct, her comprehensive review of the massive legal powers 
of law enforcement suggests that she may believe that the Court’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence has gone too far in supporting state intervention and 
control over individual rights. 
 146.  Id. at 12.  In his foundational 1974 article on the Fourth 
Amendment, Professor Anthony Amsterdam presciently commented that 
“[t]he pressures upon policemen to use the stop-and-frisk power as a device 
for exploratory evidence searches in [urban areas] are intense.  Police can 
justify virtually any exercise of the power because these are the ‘high-crime’ 
areas where all young males, at least, are suspect.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 438 (1974).  
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In strong language, she explained how the Court’s ruling in 
this case legitimized this type of illegal conduct and told all 
individuals that “your body is subject to invasion while courts 
excuse the violation of your rights.  It implied that you are not a 
citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just 
waiting to be catalogued.”147  Justice Sotomayor’s view of the 
Court’s complicity in this violation is consistent with the different 
vision of the purpose of the exclusionary rule that she expressed 
earlier in the dissent.  After noting the rule’s deterrence purpose, 
she said, “[i]t also keeps courts from being ‘made party to lawless 
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting 
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.’”148  
When courts admit illegally obtained evidence, “they reward 
‘manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution.’”149  By reviving the early judicial integrity rationale 
for the exclusionary rule, Justice Sotomayor made clear that it is 
not only police, but also the judiciary that is responsible for this 
denigration of citizens’ rights. 
Justice Sotomayor’s position speaks to her obvious concern for 
the state of police-community relations in this country.  Both in 
her dissent and at the oral argument in the case, she invoked the 
example of Ferguson, Missouri, the site of protests and unrest in 
2014 after the fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-
old African-American, by a white police officer.150  At the oral 
 
Professor Amsterdam had co-authored with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
and the ACLU an amicus brief in Terry v. Ohio, which had argued that the 
Court should utilize the probable cause standard for stop and frisks. See 
Tracey Maclin, Anthony Amsterdam’s Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
and What it Teaches About the Good and the Bad in Rodriguez v. United 
States, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1939, 1941–42, n.9 (2016) (discussing Amsterdam’s 
brief) (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 113672)).  
Professor Maclin further discusses recent litigation in New York, in which a 
federal judge found that the New York City Police Department’s stop and 
frisk practices violated the rights of blacks and Hispanics. Id. at 1939, 1942, 
n.13 (citing Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
 147.  Strieff, slip op. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 148.  Id. at 3 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
 149.  Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 393, 394 (1914)). 
 150.  Id. at 8 (discussing the outstanding numbers of warrants in 
Ferguson); Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, 
slip op. (U.S. 2016) (“If you have a town like Ferguson, where 80 percent of 
the residents have minor traffic warrants out, there may be a very good 
incentive for just standing on the street corner in Ferguson and asking every 
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argument, addressing the attorney for the State, she said: 
Don’t you think it’s enough of a deterrence to say to a 
police officer in this situation, you should have reasonable 
suspicion?  You know the Fourth Amendment requires it.  
So before you do an intrusive act demanding 
identification, you do what you’re permitted to do, which 
is just to ask the person whether they’ll talk to you.  Don’t 
you think that would improve the relationship between the 
public and the police?  Wouldn’t that be the appropriate 
encouragement we would give, if we don’t let police do 
these things in questionable situations?151 
For Justice Sotomayor, the concern of what may follow from 
the Court’s decision is very real. At one point in the oral 
argument, she noted that the brief of either the State or the 
amicus brief of the Justice Department had said, “the public will 
stop this if they don’t like police stopping you with no cause.”152  
On a somewhat ominous note, she then commented, “I think the 
public may end up stopping things but in a way the police are not 
going to like.”153 
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained that the illegal 
conduct harms not just its immediate victims, but all of us.  The 
people targeted by police are the “canaries in the coal mine,” 
telling us that illegal police stops “corrode all our civil liberties 
and threaten all our lives.  Until their voices matter too, our 
justice system will continue to be anything but.”154 
CONCLUSION 
In Utah v. Strieff, the Court dealt a further blow to the 
exclusionary rule.  It professed to be applying existing attenuation 
doctrine.  However, its finding that an outstanding warrant 
discovered through exploitation of an illegal stop serves as an 
 
citizen, give me your ID; let me see your name. And let me hope, because I 
have an 80 percent chance that you’re going to have a warrant.”). 
 151.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Utah v. Strieff, No. 14-1373, 
slip op. (U.S. 2016) (emphasis added). 
 152.  Id. at 20. 
 153.  Id. 
 154. Strieff, slip op. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing L. GUINIER & 
G. TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 274–78 (2002)).  Justice Sotomayor closed 
her dissent with the words “I dissent,” omitting the traditional “respectfully.” 
Id. at 12. 
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“intervening circumstance” which can dissipate the taint of 
unconstitutional police conduct signals a new and broad reading of 
the attenuation exception.155  The Court’s characterization of 
deliberate police misconduct as “good faith negligence” and thus 
not “purposeful and flagrant” illegality further demonstrates its 
willingness to expand the exception and constrict the application 
of the exclusionary rule.156  The Court did not eliminate the 
exclusionary rule entirely, but its decision in Utah v. Strieff may 
indicate that it is dying a slow death of attrition. 
But it is Justice Sotomayor’s dissent that remains most in the 
mind after reading Utah v. Strieff.  She understands that the 
context of this case, the routine stops and warrant checks that 
happen all over this country multiple times each day, makes the 
Court’s limitations on the exclusionary rule particularly 
significant.  She insists on grounding Fourth Amendment law in 
the realities of public experience, and calls upon us to recognize 
the impact that police overreaching and judicial condonation of 
that conduct has on our citizenry. 
 
 155.  See id. at 6. 
 156.  See id. at 8, 9. 
